Fraudulent bank details look normal at batch level
A payee changes their account number at 11pm. Your batch summary shows 4,800 valid rows. The bad one sits right in the middle.
Your AP team uploads 5,000 payees. Three accounts changed bank details yesterday. Gruv flags them, holds those payout instructions for review, and lets the rest proceed on schedule.
A payee changes their account number at 11pm. Your batch summary shows 4,800 valid rows. The bad one sits right in the middle.
At 200 payees, manual checks feel manageable. At 10,000, one missed watchlist match creates real regulatory exposure.
A payee who earned $500/month suddenly claims $12,000. The batch total looks fine. The outlier goes unnoticed.
When the same operator controls every step, a single compromised account can drain the batch.
Every payee hits sanctions checks. Anomalies route to a human queue. Approvals and releases require separate roles. The audit trail records every decision.
Every payee runs against watchlists before entering the batch. Matches hold automatically.
Flag unusual amounts, sudden destination changes, and velocity spikes before release.
Suspicious records route to a review queue. Clean payouts keep moving on schedule.
The person who edits a payee profile cannot also approve the batch and release funds.
Operators see enough context to investigate without exposing raw bank account numbers.
Screening results, hold reasons, reviewer decisions, and release timestamps. All exportable.
Only authorized reviewers release funds. Every hold, approval, and release records who acted and why.
Every payee runs against OFAC, EU, and UN lists before the batch moves to approval.
Confirm the destination account, name, and profile still match before funds release.
Sudden amount jumps, new destinations, or burst activity trigger automatic holds for review.
Fraud patterns look different at 10,000 payees than at 100. These are the shapes Gruv surfaces for your ops team across your program.
Collusion
Five "different" payees share the same device fingerprint and bank. They registered within 48 hours of each other.
Takeover
A payee who has been stable for 18 months suddenly changes their bank details at 2am. Next payout cycle, $8,000 goes to a new account.
Mule
Funds arrive and move onward within minutes. The payee account is just a waypoint.
Synthetic
Generated IDs pass basic document checks. Over months, they accumulate small payouts that add up to significant loss.
Gruv imports payout batches from your ERP, validates every row, processes async, and exports results your finance team c
Gruv gives finance, support, and ops one workspace to review payout batches, assign exceptions, and trace every disburse
Gruv collects W-9, W-8BEN, and VAT documents from payees, gates payouts until forms are on file, and ties reporting evid

Your AP team uploads 5,000 payees. Three accounts changed bank details yesterday. Gruv flags them, holds those payout instructions for review, and lets the rest proceed on schedule.
Many teams start with a narrow launch in weeks.